Threat model

How we compare to other vaults

How a vault works on the inside tells you surprisingly little about how it fails. A threat model looks at the edges instead: who can ask the vault for something, and what it takes to get a yes. For each product below, we lay out what an attacker needs to get that yes.

Most vaults protect a key with cryptography, but access is determined by a password or API credentials. An attacker rarely needs to break the cryptography, because it isn’t the weak point: stolen credentials open the door, and the vault does the rest. That’s why even impressive techniques such as MPC and DFC change nothing the way they’re used today. The SplitSecure Threshold Vault collapses cryptography and access control into one. The key doesn’t exist until enough of your Guardian Team approves, so a stolen credential has nothing to unlock. That is the core of what it does differently.

Some work has to run with nobody there to approve it. For that we also offer the SplitSecure Online Vault, in early access. It works like the other policy-based vaults, so it appears below with the same answer they get.

Passwords

Passwords are a legacy technology: a password has to be handed over in full every time it is used. We manage them so your team can leave its password manager, and then replace them, login by login, with a passkey, single sign-on or a certificate. See Privileged access.

What an attacker needs
Who reviews each use
The concern
Where the password is
Password manager1Password, Bitwarden, LastPass
One unlocked vault, or the master password†1
No one reviews it.
One unlock exposes every password, to you and to any malware on that device.
It is on each device, encrypted until you unlock the whole vault.
SplitSecure Online VaultEarly access
One valid credential
No one reviews it. The policy decides.
A valid credential gets every password it is granted, as with any policy-based vault. Use it for daily, routine access.
It is encrypted in storage. An attested enclave holds the key that opens it while the vault is unsealed. It reaches the caller over a confidential TLS channel that ends in that enclave, and can be envelope-encrypted on top.
SplitSecure Threshold Vault
Your Guardian Team’s approval, for every password†2
Your Guardian Team sees who asks, for which password, and the reason given.
Every password waits for an approval, and enough approvers must be reachable. Use it for high-sensitivity accounts.
It is encrypted in storage. The key that opens it exists only as shares, and SplitSecure holds none. After approval, an attested runtime that you choose combines the shares, and the password always leaves envelope-encrypted.†3

This table is based on the public documentation of 1Password, Bitwarden and LastPass, and on each product’s default configuration. If a claim about a product is wrong, write to contact@splitsecure.com and we will correct it.

†1 With a stolen copy of the vault, the master password is enough to open it offline. 1Password also requires a Secret Key, which is created on your device and never sent to its servers.

†2 Your Guardian Team is the set of devices you choose to approve requests. Each one holds shares of the key on attested hardware that you own: Apple devices with App Attest, Android devices with StrongBox, AWS Nitro Enclaves, AMD SEV-SNP, Intel TDX or Google Cloud Confidential Space. SplitSecure holds no shares. One approval can cover a batch of passwords.

†3 A released password is always encrypted for the device that asked, with a key that the device uses once and then deletes. This gives each release forward secrecy.

Secrets

What an attacker needs
Who reviews each use
The concern
Where the secret is
Secrets managerHashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager
One access token
No one reviews it. Any caller with access gets the secret.
The secret is only as safe as every app and person that can read it.
It is encrypted in storage. The service holds the key that opens it, and decrypts for each caller.
Split-key secrets managerAkeyless
One access token
No one reviews it. Any caller with access gets the secret.
A valid access token grants access to the secret. How the key is stored (DFC, zero-knowledge architecture, customer-held fragment) makes no difference to that.
It is encrypted on the vendor’s service. By default, the vendor holds every key fragment.†1
SplitSecure Online VaultEarly access
One valid credential
No one reviews it. The policy decides.
A valid credential gets the secret, as with any policy-based vault. Use it for apps that must read a secret unattended.
It is encrypted in storage. An attested enclave holds the key that opens it while the vault is unsealed. It reaches the caller over a confidential TLS channel that ends in that enclave, and can be envelope-encrypted on top.
SplitSecure Threshold Vault
Your Guardian Team’s approval, for every release†2
Your Guardian Team sees who asks, for which secret, and the reason given.
Every release waits for approvers. An app cannot read a secret without Guardian Team approval. Use it for high-sensitivity secrets.
It is encrypted in storage. The key that opens it exists only as shares, and SplitSecure holds none. After approval, an attested runtime that you choose combines the shares, and the secret always leaves envelope-encrypted.†3

This table is based on the public documentation of HashiCorp, AWS and Akeyless, and on each product’s default configuration. If a claim about a product is wrong, write to contact@splitsecure.com and we will correct it.

†1 Akeyless lets a customer hold one fragment on its own gateway. Akeyless states that such an operation completes when identity and policy checks pass. The fragment protects against the vendor, and not against a stolen access token.

†2 Your Guardian Team is the set of devices you choose to approve requests. Each one holds shares of the key on attested hardware that you own: Apple devices with App Attest, Android devices with StrongBox, AWS Nitro Enclaves, AMD SEV-SNP, Intel TDX or Google Cloud Confidential Space. SplitSecure holds no shares. One approval can cover a batch of secrets.

†3 A released secret is always encrypted for the device that asked, with a key that the device uses once and then deletes. This gives each release forward secrecy.

Privileged access

What an attacker needs
Who reviews each use
The concern
Where the key is
PAM vaultCyberArk, BeyondTrust, HashiCorp Vault with Boundary
The vault server, or one account that its policy allows
No one reviews it, unless you add an approval step.†1
Every privileged credential sits behind one server. Whoever takes it has them all.
It is encrypted in storage. The vault server holds the key that opens it while it runs.
Certificate authorityTeleport
The CA key, or one trusted login
No one reviews it, unless you add an approval step.†1
One key can issue access to every system. Whoever takes it can sign in anywhere.
It is in the service’s database and in its memory.
SplitSecure Online VaultEarly access
One valid credential
No one reviews it. The policy decides.
A valid credential gets access, as with any policy-based vault. Use it for access that must work unattended.
An attested enclave holds it while the vault is unsealed. Only the result leaves, over a confidential TLS channel that ends in that enclave, and it can be envelope-encrypted on top.
SplitSecure Threshold Vault
Your Guardian Team’s approval, for every access†2
Your Guardian Team sees who asks, for which system, and the reason given.
Access waits for an approval. Enough approvers must be reachable.
It exists nowhere, and SplitSecure holds no shares. It is rebuilt for one request in an attested runtime that you choose, then erased.

This table is based on the public documentation of CyberArk, BeyondTrust, HashiCorp and Teleport, and on each product’s default configuration. If a claim about a product is wrong, write to contact@splitsecure.com and we will correct it.

†1 These products can add an approval step. The same server enforces it, so an attacker who takes the server skips it.

†2 Your Guardian Team is the set of devices you choose to approve requests. Each one holds shares of the key on attested hardware that you own: Apple devices with App Attest, Android devices with StrongBox, AWS Nitro Enclaves, AMD SEV-SNP, Intel TDX or Google Cloud Confidential Space. SplitSecure holds no shares. One approval can cover a batch of requests.

Signing keys

What an attacker needs
Who reviews each use
The concern
Where the key is
Key managerHashiCorp Vault
One access token
No one reviews it. It signs raw bytes, with no explanation of what they are.†1
The key is hard to steal. The access token that uses it is not.
It is encrypted in storage. The server keeps the key that opens it in memory while it runs.
Split keyAkeyless
One access token
No one reviews it. It signs raw bytes, with no explanation of what they are.
A valid access token gets a signature. How the key is stored (DFC, zero-knowledge architecture, customer-held fragment) makes no difference to that.
By default, every fragment is on the vendor’s servers.†2
SplitSecure Online VaultEarly access
One valid credential
No one reviews it. The policy decides.
A valid credential gets a signature, as with any policy-based vault. Use it for pipelines that sign unattended.
An attested enclave holds it while the vault is unsealed. Only the result leaves, over a confidential TLS channel that ends in that enclave, and it can be envelope-encrypted on top.
SplitSecure Threshold Vault
Your Guardian Team’s approval, for every signature†3
Your Guardian Team sees what will be signed.
Every signature waits for approvers. It cannot run unattended.
It exists nowhere, and SplitSecure holds no shares. It is rebuilt for one signature in an attested runtime that you choose, then erased.

This table is based on the public documentation of HashiCorp and Akeyless, and on each product’s default configuration. If a claim about a product is wrong, write to contact@splitsecure.com and we will correct it.

†1 HashiCorp Vault can add an approval step with control groups, a feature of Vault Enterprise. The same server enforces it.

†2 Akeyless lets a customer hold one fragment on its own gateway. Akeyless states that such an operation completes when identity and policy checks pass. The fragment protects against the vendor, and not against a stolen access token.

†3 Your Guardian Team is the set of devices you choose to approve requests. Each one holds shares of the key on attested hardware that you own: Apple devices with App Attest, Android devices with StrongBox, AWS Nitro Enclaves, AMD SEV-SNP, Intel TDX or Google Cloud Confidential Space. SplitSecure holds no shares. One approval can cover a batch of signatures.

Digital assets

What an attacker needs
Who reviews each use
The concern
Where the key is
Hardware walletLedger, Trezor
The device and its PIN
The holder reviews it on the device screen.
One device and one person hold everything.
It is inside one device.
Multisig walletSafe, Squads
Enough of the signers’ devices
Each signer reviews it in their own wallet.
Nothing guarantees how each signer keeps their key. Each approval is recorded on chain, so the cost grows with every required signature†1, and each chain needs its own setup.
Each signer’s device holds a complete key.
MPC custodyFireblocks, Dfns
One caller’s API credentials, inside what the policy allows†2
Policy rules decide, and approvers review it if you require them.†3
Valid API credentials get a signature. How the vendor protects the key (MPC, secure enclaves) makes no difference to that.
It is split between the vendor and you.
SplitSecure Online VaultEarly access
One valid credential
No one reviews it. The policy decides.
A valid credential gets a signature, as with any policy-based vault. Use it for hot wallets.
An attested enclave holds it while the vault is unsealed. Only the result leaves, over a confidential TLS channel that ends in that enclave, and it can be envelope-encrypted on top.
SplitSecure Threshold Vault
Your Guardian Team’s approval, for every transaction†4
Your Guardian Team sees the transaction before it is signed.
A transfer waits for an approval, so it is not built for automated payouts. Use it for cold wallets and low-frequency hot wallets.
It exists nowhere, and SplitSecure holds no shares. It is rebuilt for one transaction in an attested runtime that you choose, then erased.

This table is based on the public documentation of Ledger, Trezor, Safe, Squads, Fireblocks and Dfns, and on each product’s default configuration. If a claim about a product is wrong, write to contact@splitsecure.com and we will correct it.

†1 The approvals are recorded inside the transaction or as transactions of their own, depending on the wallet. A chain with signature aggregation, such as BLS or Schnorr, avoids the extra cost.

†2 Fireblocks authenticates an API call with an API key and a request that the caller signs with its private key. Both are on the caller’s server.

†3 Fireblocks and Dfns can require approvers for a transaction. The policy engine enforces that rule too.

†4 Your Guardian Team is the set of devices you choose to approve requests. Each one holds shares of the key on attested hardware that you own: Apple devices with App Attest, Android devices with StrongBox, AWS Nitro Enclaves, AMD SEV-SNP, Intel TDX or Google Cloud Confidential Space. SplitSecure holds no shares. One approval can cover a batch of transactions.